Showing posts with label Airport Admin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Airport Admin. Show all posts

Thursday, April 5, 2012

Air pockets ahead for Changi


22 March 12  The Straits Times  by Karamjit Kaur

CHANGI'S quest to stay at the top of the world airports league is about to hit some air pockets. And just as a smooth touchdown depends on a match of skill and chemistry between the pilot and the control tower, the key to Changi's continued success will be how well Singapore's aviation regulator and the airport operator fly together.

The challenge for Changi is how to keep up with the rise in passenger numbers and expectations.
Earlier this month, the Transport Ministry set up an 11-member working group helmed by Minister of State Josephine Teo to assess Changi's infrastructure and other requirements in the coming decades. Recommendations will be made within a year.
Plans have meanwhile been unveiled to close down the Budget Terminal in September to make way for a newer, bigger facility slated for opening by 2017.
Until then, life is going to get busier at Terminal 2, which will absorb the budget traveller traffic. The terminal which handled 13 million passengers last year will see the traffic swell overnight to about 18 million.

Still, that is not as bad as it might seem. T2 can take up to 23 million passengers a year. In 2007 - the year before T3 opened - it handled 21.5 million passengers.
What this episode does highlight, though, are concerns about Changi's long-term capacity - the focus of the Transport Ministry's working group.

The Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation (Capa), an industry think-tank, said recently that if Changi continues to grow its traffic by 8 per cent a year - the average since 2004 - the airport will hit full capacity by the time the new terminal opens.
Singapore needs not one but two new terminals by the end of this decade, Capa said, and a third runway as well, to cope with increasing flights.

The team planning Changi's future has a tough job, for two reasons.
One is the sheer logistics. The next phase of Changi's expansion will go beyond the current airport boundary. There is no space for another terminal on existing airport land.
The next big terminal is likely to be erected next to Runway 3, more familiar as the venue for the biennial Singapore Airshow.
If cleared for take-off, the project will be massive and costly. Not only is there a main road - Changi Coast Road - separating the area from existing airport land, Runway 3 is not connected to the other two runways.

Planners will have to find a way to move aircraft, travellers, bags and cargo between the two locations. This is a formidable, but essentially a design, challenge. Options include flyovers as well as underground links.
The second issue, which might call for even more heavy lifting by the Transport Ministry's panel, is how to reconcile the divergence in the interests of the two stakeholders - the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and Changi Airport Group (CAG).
In 2009 when CAAS was split into two arms - one to regulate the industry and the other to run the airport - the rationale was to ensure Singapore remained a premier aviation hub.
As a corporate entity, the airport would be more independent and able to react nimbly to increasing competition, the Government said then.
But it would not be focused solely on the bottom line and the assurance to travellers was that the change would not affect the level of service they had come to associate with Changi.
Three years later, aviation insiders say the regulator and the operator do not always see eye to eye.
The ends remain the same - more airlines and flights, and happy travellers - but the means sometimes differ. And this is especially so when it comes to capacity issues.
For more than three decades, Changi's mantra - now that of the CAAS - has been to build ahead of capacity.

When T3 opened in 2008, some travellers described it as a 'ghost town' because it was so empty. Airport retailers were not happy either. Four years later, the terminal is utilising just 57 per cent of its annual passenger handling ability.
Overall, Changi's total traffic takes up 64 per cent of available capacity now.
Travellers don't like crowded terminals. They want room to move around and enough chairs to sit on while waiting for flights.
But even as it is important to please the customer, airport operators are also mindful of the need to ensure the efficient use of assets and resources so they can run viable - and more importantly, profitable - operations.
The question for Changi Airport Group then, is whether it is cost-effective to operate the airport at such low capacity levels, as is the present case, or whether it should pack more people into the terminals.

Other major airport hubs in Hong Kong, South Korea and London reportedly run at more than 80 per cent of total capacity, and are profitable.
The same goes for runways.
Even as calls are being made for Changi to operate a third runway - in line with the 'build ahead of capacity' mentality - an observer with CAG's hat on would point out that while Changi Airport handled 302,000 take-offs and landings last year, Heathrow, which also has two runways, did 476,197.
So instead of rushing to invest in a third runway, perhaps the focus could be on improving efficiency with the current two.

At the end of the day, even if there are some flight delays and terminals become more crowded, would it really hurt Changi's image that much?
The team planning Changi's future will have to tackle the differences between CAAS and CAG when deciding when to build the new terminal and who will pay for it and the related infrastructure works. All these issues will have to be considered carefully, with one eye on the need to ensure the airport's continued success and the other on Changi Airport Group's business interests.
Where the line is drawn will determine the Changi Airport that will greet travellers 10 to 15 years from now.

http://www.singaporeairfreight.com/SingleNews.aspx?DirID=137&rec_code=797131

Sunday, December 26, 2010

Four reasons why London's Heathrow Airport faltered under snow

Passengers queue outside Terminal 3, to have their boarding passes checked as disruption continues due to bad weather leading to the cancellation of some flights at London's Heathrow Airport, Wednesday, Dec., 22. (Alastair Grant/AP)

London's Heathrow Airport, one of the world's busiest, is getting back on its feet after winter storms led to massive delays and left more than 100,000 travelers stranded. Even though flights are resuming, the backlog means that it will be at least another day before the flight schedule returns to normal. Finger-pointing for the delays abound and the chief executive of BAA, the company that operates Heathrow, said he will not take his annual bonus due to the mess. Is he to blame? What else could be the cause?


http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1222/Four-reasons-why-London-s-Heathrow-Airport-faltered-under-snow/Overcrowded-flight-schedule

Friday, December 24, 2010

Heathrow boss is shamed into giving up his bonus as it is revealed airport 'failed' to order enough de-icer to cope with heavy snow

Airport Delays at Heathrow – Who is to Blame?

To date, most people – and most legislators - tend to focus on the airlines when delays occur, and for sure, airlines vary in their degree of adequate response to disruptions to their service.  For their part, the airlines have been quick to blame external things when things go wrong – weather, air traffic control, whatever.
 
Strangely one part of the aviation puzzle has generally been given a free ride and exempted from obligations and blame – the airports.  But is this correct?  What part of the blame must airports accept when, as is the case presently in Europe, bad weather forces the airport to close itself down and cancel all flights in and out?  Let’s have a look.

As you probably know, bad weather all across Europe has disrupted airport operations, also all across Europe.  This has been occurring pretty much for all of December to a varying degree, and to a massive extent over the last week and weekend.

All of this is regrettable, but particular focus needs to be given to the appalling problems at Heathrow; not only because it seems to be suffering the most but also due to its unique position as such a vital link in the global aviation network.

The usual rules about free market competition seldom apply to airports, and completely do not apply to airports in Britain.  The UK government has essentially declared a moratorium not just on developing new airports but also on expanding current airports.  Free market forces can’t create new airports to compete with Heathrow, and neither can airlines or passengers conveniently choose alternate airports if they wish to avoid Heathrow.  We all – airlines and passengers alike – are locked into a love/hate relationship with Heathrow accordingly.

When any type of product or service or utility is restricted and exempted from fair market competition, it becomes sadly necessary to consider the need for government regulation to compensate for the lack of market forces, and this is definitely the case with London’s airports, and most of all, Heathrow.

For various reasons, mainly historical, Heathrow has assumed a dominant role as London’s (and England’s, and indeed, for the UK as a whole) prime airport gateway to the world.  It has an equally important role as a connecting hub for people traveling from one country, going through Heathrow and then connecting on to another flight, somewhere else.
Heathrow claims to be the busiest airport in the world in terms of international passengers.  In terms of domestic and international passenger numbers, it is the world’s third or fourth largest airport (Atlanta is first, Beijing is second, and Heathrow may have recently lost out to Chicago/O’Hare for third position, falling now to fourth).

Whatever its rank, and by whatever measure, it is fair to say both that Britain and much of the world relies on Heathrow.

The owners/operators of Heathrow are in a special position, where they must be relied upon not to abuse their position of trust, and the position of marketplace privilege they enjoy.  They must either be relied upon – or externally regulated – not only in terms of things like not charging ridiculously unfair fees to airlines and passengers (and airport concession operators, etc etc) but also in terms of providing a quality and standard of service that their customers/clients should reasonably expect and rely upon.

Heathrow is owned by BAA (no relation to BA – BAA a company formerly known as British Airports Authority) which in turn is controlled and largely owned by a Spanish company, Ferrovial.

Let’s first look at whether Heathrow is proving to be profitable or not for BAA/Ferrovial.  If Heathrow is losing money terribly, we arguably might accept weaker expectations for the standard of service provided at Heathrow than if it is profitable.

On 16 December, BAA expressed confidence about exceeding its 2010 target earnings, with an expectation that it will exceed its earlier projected £972 million dollar profit (and don’t forget this has been a bad year, with depressed aviation, a bad global economy, the mess of the Icelandic volcano disruptions, and BA strikes, earlier in the year).

For next year, BAA is projecting revenue to rise 10.7% to £2.3 billion, and profit to increase by 15.2% (on an EBITDA basis – before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) of £1.12 billion.  BAA projects a record number of passengers going through Heathrow next year – 70.4 million, up 6.2% from what it expects this year to close off at (by comparison, its other London airport, Stansted, is projecting a 5.1% drop in passenger numbers down to 17.6 million, due to Ryanair shifting flights away from there).

So, let’s understand this.  Heathrow is wildly profitable for its owners (although it is highly leveraged and the owners have substantial borrowings and interest costs associated with it).  They can pretty much afford any type of snow removal/weather control equipment they choose to own.

Now let’s understand the weather problems at Heathrow.  It was cold, and moderately snowy and icy.  But no snow has fallen at Heathrow since a 4” fall that ended on Saturday morning.  However, the airport has been essentially completely closed for Saturday, Sunday, and yes – Monday too (reports suggest between 16 – 22 flights departed on Monday, compared to 650 originally scheduled).  On Tuesday – with no snow predicted - they are forecasting no more than one third of scheduled flights will depart (and of course the actual number may end up less than this).

The appalling performance at Heathrow was contrasted with the situation at Gatwick, which only closed for less than five hours on Saturday, and where 300+ flights departed on both Sunday and Monday.

It is estimated that more than half a million people have had their travel plans disrupted – so far.  All going well, it will take about five days for people to be rescheduled onto alternate flights; and with more snow predicted for Wednesday/Thursday, it is hard to confidently expect that all will indeed go well.

It is easy to read this number – half a million – and then keep reading.  But think about that, and think about the other millions of people affected by the non-arrival of these half million.  People don’t just travel for Christmas – some travel for other occasions such as weddings, funerals, birthdays, etc.  Business people travel for other reasons, and must now be counting the cost of deals not closed, and of wasted days spent unproductively in the wrong part of the world.

Think about the utter complete and total misery and frustration of people, marooned at an airport, sleeping on the floor (have you ever tried that, by the way?), unable to phone through to their airline, and not having any idea at all when and how they will be able to travel to their destination.

Let’s think about another measure – say half a million people each wait an average of two days to get an alternate flight (this is probably understanding the total time lost/wasted enormously).  That represents 2740 man-years of time wasted.  With an average lifespan of say 70 years, this could be interpreted as 40 people have been ‘killed’ by these delays.
So how can a moderate snow fall, ending on Saturday morning, cause Heathrow to close for 72+ hours?  We’re not talking about some country airstrip in the middle of nowhere.  We’re talking about the self-styled ‘busiest airport in the world’.

This problem was nothing to do with flying conditions.  Planes could take off and land with no problems whatsoever, other than those caused by the icy and snowy runways and taxiways.  The problem is primarily to do with clearing the runways and taxiways.

The question is actually easily answered.  Self-evidently, there were too few snow plows, too few blowers, too few tankers spraying anti-icing compound on the ground, and too few staff.
Look at the picture taken at Heathrow at the top of this article.  Two men with shovels (and only one shoveling, the other one watching, doing nothing) while the snow is falling heavily all around them.  Is that the best BAA could manage?

(Partial answer – of course there were more than two people deployed, but the picture does tell a compelling story, doesn’t it!  Where are the snow plows?  What is the point of that narrow pathway these two men are shoveling?)

How is it that with whatever resource the airport does have, they still couldn’t even average one departing flight per hour on Monday, two days after the snow stopped falling?  They should be able to send planes out once every minute or two, but they couldn’t even do it once an hour.

Another part of the question is – if they could manage to dispatch one plane every hour or so, why only one?  What was the restriction that allowed one plane to go, but not ten or twenty or thirty more?

Think about it.  We all know that it can take 10 – 15 minutes of taxiing to get to the take-off point at Heathrow, so even if only one plane was allowed to be moving, anywhere, on the ground at a time (an unthinkable restriction) surely they could have sent four planes off an hour?

There is no way to explain and no way to justify this appalling outcome.  Its cost in human life and suffering, in lost business, in every possible dimension, is huge beyond measure.
One has to assume that BAA made a cold but incorrectly calculated decision at some earlier point to economize on its snow handling capabilities.  That decision needs to now have consequences – if it does not, then BAA will be free to continue to provide an appallingly poor service at a critical part of Britain and the world’s aviation infrastructure.

Imagine if a fire department made a similar decision – instead of having more fire trucks and fire fighters than they reasonably expect to ever need, with more on call from neighboring jurisdictions, imagine if they said ‘most of the time, we only ever need one fire truck, and even then it is probably a false alarm, so we’re selling off the rest of our equipment’.  Imagine if the police staffed for average rather than peak levels.  Or the paramedics.  Imagine if the power company was unable to handle occasional demand peaks, and responded by cutting off all power to half a million people for up to a week.

These situations are all unthinkable and unacceptable.  So too is the loss of Britain’s prime airport due to inadequately providing for snow removal capabilities.  What is BAA doing with its almost 50% gross profit, its £1 billion plus of EBITDA profit?

BAA should be made personally liable for every lost penny by every person and company inconvenienced by their disgraceful mismanagement of a simple situation, and should further be required to pay massive compensation for the lost time and inconvenience suffered both by passengers unable to fly out, and also by passengers all around the world unable to fly in.
BAA needs to reimburse and compensate everyone harmed by their mismanagement.  This extends beyond the people unable to fly, and goes also to the airlines unable to fly their passengers, to airport concessions losing money due to an interruption in the normal flow of passengers and related business opportunities, to freight carriers, and to the companies not receiving the freight they had ordered in time for Christmas sales.

If this bankrupts BAA, so much the better.  BAA was trusted with the management of a vital strategic resource.  All of us who schedule our travel (or our freight) to or through Heathrow are relying on BAA to keep the airport open and running smoothly.  BAA have clearly shown themselves unable to honorably meet this obligation.

BAA’s chief executive has said he is ‘really disappointed to have disrupted to many thousands of people’s Christmas plans’.  He added ‘I couldn’t be more sorry, that’s the case’.  But he is as wrong about this as he was about the snow management plans he was ultimately responsible for.
He would be much more sorry if he found himself out on the street, unemployed.  He would be much more sorry if his company found itself with half a billion pounds or more in compensation payments.  He would be much more sorry if his company was forced to give up (not sell, give up) Heathrow entirely.

If Britain is happy with a third world service approach to its ‘flagship’ airport, then by all means, let this disgrace fade away and be diluted down by various official investigations and inquiries and reports.  But if Britain wishes to reaffirm Heathrow’s primacy as a world class leading airport, it needs to do something aggressive to ensure this never happens again.  Because if Britain doesn’t fix its Heathrow problem, we as travelers will vote with our feet, and we’ll travel to Europe through other connecting airports, and we’ll do all we can to avoid travel to Heathrow.

I’ve never understood why people so massively prefer flying to Heathrow rather than Gatwick anyway!  Try Gatwick for your next journey to Britain – you’ll find it almost as quick and easy to get from the plane to central London through Gatwick as it is through Heathrow, and your chances of being able to travel in the snow are massively improved.

Don’t forget London’s other three airports, too.  See my complete review and description of all five London airports for more details about Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London City.

http://blog.thetravelinsider.info/2010/12/airport-delays-at-heathrow-who-is-to-blame.html

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Changi Airport unveils a raft of customer service initiatives

Published: 28/09/10
Source: ©The Moodie Report
By Mary Jane Pittilla, Brands Editor




http://www.moodiereport.com/document.php?c_id=1178&doc_id=25373

FACT SHEETS ON CHANGI AIRPORT’S CUSTOMER CENTRIC INITIATIVES

included are:

Initiatives 
1. SWIFT – Service Workforce Instant Feedback Transformation
2. VOTES – Valuing Our Tenants’ Excellent Service
3. Workforce Survey
4. New Tourist Refund Scheme
5. iChangi (mobile application and interactive kiosk)
6. Care@Changi
7. CHANGI Identity
8. Speedpost@Changi
9. Fast Tray Return System
10. Workforce Skills Qualifications and Service Literacy Test
11. Passenger Reconciliation System
12. Taxi Management System and Carpark Information System


http://www.airports.org/aci/ACIAPAC/File/News%20Release%20Docs/News_Members/The%20Changi%20Experience%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Evaluating terminal management performances using SLAM: The 3 case of Athens International Airport

Abstract
Athens in Greece is the city selected to host the 2004 Olympic Games. Many simulations and analyses have been performed in order to properly approach the logistics problems arising from such an event. In this paper we address one of these problems. More precisely,we present a model for analyzing the terminal of Athens International Airport (AIA) under three different scenarios: (i) a historic scenario, based on a typical “busy day”, (ii) a foreseeable scenario with AIA becoming a hub and increasing its traffic volume, and (iii) a traffic intense scenario, as expected during the 2004 Olympic Games. The airport simulation is performed through the OPAL platform. While the airside analysis does not evidence any major cause of congestion, the landside, evaluated through an enhanced version of the simple 15 landside aggregate model (SLAM), shows possible situations of congestion with a consequent degradation in the level of service provided. The use of SLAM allows signaling out the bottlenecks and the corresponding possible causes. A simple modification in the airport policies is sufficient to significantly improve the overall performance.
2005 Published by Elsevier Lt

http://www.dei.unipd.it/~brunetta/at_papers/cor.pdf

Monday, June 21, 2010

http://dcaa.slv.dk:8000/icaodocs/


Various down-loadable Regulatory Documents, including the 18 Annexes by the Statens Luftfartsvæsen, Civil Aviation Administration of Denmark.

Directory:
Doc 4444 - Air Traffic Management
Doc 7030 - Regional Supplementary Procedures
Doc 7190 - Location Indicators
Doc 8400 - PANS- ICAO Abbreviations and Codes
Doc 8643 - Aircraft Type Designators
Doc 9082 - ICAO's Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services
Doc 9432 - Manual of Radiotelephony
Doc 9562 - Airport Economics Manual
Doc 9859 - Safety Management Manual
Doc 9613 - Manual on Required Navigational Performance (RNP)
Doc 9731 - International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual

Doc 8168 - Aircraft Operations
Doc 9328 - Manual of Runway Visual Range and Observing and Reporting Practices
Doc 8585 - Designators for Aircraft Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services 


Contributed by Wei Jie

Sunday, June 6, 2010

Average total annual remuneration for the year of 2008

Ben: This article will be useful to you when doing your Airport Admin project :)
PS:When you need to estimate the wage of our Airport key players



MP's question
*907. Mr Siew Kum Hong: To ask the Prime Minister (a) what was
the average total annual remuneration for the year of 2008 (inclusive
of all bonuses) for political appointment holders and civil servants
whose remuneration is pegged to (i) MR4 benchmark and (ii) SR9
benchmark; and (b) what was the average amount of performance
bonus paid to each of these groups, in terms of the number of months
of salary and also in terms of the absolute monetary figure.


Answer
1. The norm total annual remuneration for the year 2008 for
political appointment holders and civil servants whose remuneration
is pegged to the MR4 benchmark was $1.92 million. This figure
includes the individual performance bonus and all other bonuses for a
typical officer. The norm total remuneration for those pegged to the
SR9 benchmark was $398,000.

2. At these senior levels, a significant proportion of the total annual
salary depends on the individual’s performance and the performance
of the economy. For an officer in the MR4 grade, the individual
performance bonus quantum can range from 0 to 14 months. A
performance bonus of 9 months was used to compute the 2008 norm
salary package (of $1.92 million) for a typical officer on MR4.
However, the actual amount awarded would vary with the officer’s
performance. In 2008, the actual performance bonus paid out for this
grade ranged from 6 to 10 months, with an average payout of 8.33
months or $455,000.

3. For SR9, the individual performance bonus quantum can range
from 0 to 8.5 months, with 4.5 months used for computing the 2008
norm salary for a typical officer. In 2008, the actual performance
bonus ranged from 0 to 6.5 months, with an average payout of 4.82
months or $86,000.

4. The above figures are 2008 salaries. This year, we will see a
drop in total annual salaries. In November 2008, the Government
announced that salaries for political, judicial and statutory
appointment holders and Administrative Officers will see a drop of up
to 19% in 2009. Total annual salaries at the MR4 grade will fall by
18% to $1.57 million and salaries at the SR9 level will fall by 12% to
$353,000.

5. With MTI’s latest GDP growth estimate at 1.5% for last year,
salaries for 2009 will see a further drop. The MR4 salary for 2009 will
now be $1.54 million, a drop of 20% compared to 2008. Salaries at
SR9 will now be $351,000, a drop of 12% compared to 2008. The
2009 salaries are projected salaries for the year. As the salaries are
linked to economic performance, the 2009 salaries may be subject to
further adjustments, given the volatility of the economy



http://www.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/pdf/20090119/Reply.pdf


Rivals snap up Changi Airport staff

http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking+News/Singapore/Story/STIStory_265724.html

A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS FOR SINGAPORE

http://news.asiaone.com/a1news/20070409_story20_8.html


  • Administrative Service and P/J/S Appointment Holders
  • Administrative Service
  • Administrative Service Salary Benchmarks
  • Salary Revisions - Adjustments for MR4
  • Adjustments for SR9
  • Adjustments for MP Allowance     
Ben: This article will be useful to you when doing your Airport Admin project :)
PS:When you need to estimate the wage of our Airport key players